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A B S T R A C T
A model of global oil production is applied to study cartelization by OPEC countries. We deﬁne a measure
for the degree of cooperation, analogous to the market conduct parameter of Cyert et al. (1973), Geroski
et al. (1987), Lofaro (1999), and Symeonidis (2000). This parameter is used to assess the incentives of differ-
ent OPEC members to collude. We ﬁnd that heterogeneity in OPEC and the supplies of the non-OPEC fringe
create strong incentives against collusion. More speciﬁcally, OPEC’s supply strategy, although observed to
be substantially more restrictive than that of a Cournot–Nash oligopoly, is found to still be more accom-
modative than that of a perfect cartel. The strategy involves allocating larger than proportionate quotas to
smaller and relatively costlier producers, as if to bribe their participation in the cartel. This is in contrast to
predictions of the standard cartel model that such producers should be allocated relatively more stringent
quotas. Furthermore, we demonstrate that cartel collusion is more likely to be sustained for elastic than for
inelastic demand. Since global oil demand is well known to be inelastic, this observation provides another
structural explanation for why OPEC behavior is inconsistent with that of a perfect cartel. Our study points
to multiple headwinds that limit OPEC’s ability to mark up the oil price.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
OPEC’s longevity, given predictions of its demise by experts and
the textbook cartelization model has come as a surprise to many. A
growing body of literature (see e.g., Smith, 2005; Kaufmann et al.,
2008) now suggests that OPEC is not and should not be regarded as
a perfectly colluding (i.e., standard) cartel. Indeed, concessions made
when bargaining for quotas may engender production allocations
that vastly diverge from those of a perfect cartel. While economic
theory prescribes that perfect cartels must assign quotas so that
marginal revenues (alternatively, full marginal costs1) are equalized
across members (Schmalensee, 1987), OPEC’s actual quota allocation
scheme plausibly diverges from this rule.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: s.j.okullo@uvt.nl (S. Okullo), frederic.reynes@tno.nl (F. Reynès).
1 Full marginal costs constitute the marginal cost of lifting the resource out of the
ground, plus all rents associated with the extraction of the resource.
Technically, equalization of marginal revenues requires that the
least eﬃcient (i.e., high cost and low reserve) producers cut their
production, so as to accommodate for relatively higher produc-
tion shares from more eﬃcient (i.e., low cost and large reserve)
producers. For OPEC, this means that Saudi Arabia would front-
load its production, while high cost producers, such as Venezuela,
would postpone theirs to a time when their (full) marginal costs
of extraction are in line with those of Saudi Arabia.2 The reverse,
however, has been observed for OPEC and some other cartels
such as the Railroad Commission of Texas3 where, the less eﬃ-
cient (i.e., the small and generally high cost) producers tend to
acquire larger than proportionate production shares (Griﬃn and
Xiong, 1997; Libecap, 1989). These less eﬃcient producers are given
2 Full marginal costs constitute the marginal cost of lifting the resource out of the
ground, plus the scarcity rent of depleting the resource.
3 This was between the 1920s and 1950s.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2016.10.010
0140-9883/ © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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unproportionally larger quotas, as if to bribe their participation in the
cartel. As shown in Polasky (1992), such a quota allocation scheme
conforms more to non-cooperative oligopoly behavior than perfect
cartelization.
The objective of this paper is to introduce a formal model of quota
negotiation in OPEC, and use it to investigate production allocations
among its members. Our main argument is that the production
scheme, where smaller producers in cartels get unproportionally
larger quotas, can be explained by concessions at the bargaining
stage. We propose a two-stage model of global oil production where,
in the ﬁrst stage, OPEC producers negotiate over production alloca-
tions, i.e., quotas. We assume that these quotas are enforceable. In
the second stage, each OPEC member chooses its optimal produc-
tion plan, subject to its quota restriction, while making independent
judgments about investments in capacity and resource development.
Non-OPEC decision making, by contrast, is conﬁned to the second
stage where optimal levels for production, investments in capacity,
and resource development are all chosen. We assume that OPEC pro-
ducers know the form of the demand function and therefore act as
prices setters. Non-OPEC producers, on other hand, know only the
time path for the global oil price. They act as a competitive fringe à
la Salant (1976).
We ﬁnd that OPEC has a substantial but not outright ability to
mark up the oil price. Smith (2005) and Kaufmann et al. (2008)
analyzing changes in output between OPEC members, and Behar and
Ritz (2016) and de Sá and Daubanes (2016) using limit-pricing the-
ory arrive at a similar conclusion.4 Differently than these studies,
we explicitly model a quota negotiation process for the OPEC car-
tel. Moreover, our analysis employs a numerical optimization model
calibrated to empirical world oil market data. This approach enables
us to assess how different attributes, such as: reserve holdings,
extraction cost, production capacity, etc., might affect a member’s
bargaining power in the cartel and its incentive to collude. As such,
we are able to evaluate from the bottom up, OPEC’s ability to deploy
an effective markup pricing strategy. Our simulation based analy-
sis can also be seen as bridging the gap between the econometric
approach (Smith, 2005; Kaufmann et al., 2008) that is often short
of data points to appropriately analyze relationships between OPEC
members; and the analytic approach (Behar and Ritz, 2016; de Sá and
Daubanes, 2016) that uses models of a monolithic OPEC in order to
derive closed form solutions which while appealing for purposes of
generalization, offer limited insights into the internal functioning of
the OPEC cartel.
To analyze OPEC collusion, we derive ameasurewhichwe dub the
coeﬃcient of cooperation. This measure is a market conduct param-
eter akin to those in Cyert and DeGroot (1973), Geroski et al. (1987),
Lofaro (1999), and Symeonidis (2000). The difference is that ours
is derived based on negotiated production allocations, rather than
being given as the weight that one colluding producer attaches to
the proﬁts of the other colluding producers. This measure is bounded
between zero and one inclusive, with zero corresponding to non-
cooperative oligopoly behavior and one to perfect collusion. In the
latter case, the cartel behaves as a single producer that owns multi-
ple resource deposits in different countries. Intermediate levels for
the coeﬃcient of cooperation correspond to imperfect collusion with
low (high) values indicating weakly (highly) collusive outcomes. The
coeﬃcient of cooperation is derived per producer, and thus provides
a way to evaluate anyone particular member’s incentive to collude.
Studies that estimate OPEC’s payoffs from cartelization with the
aim of assessing its ability to raise the global oil price by limiting
output include Pindyck (1978a), Griﬃn and Xiong (1997), and
4 Behar and Ritz (2016) and de Sá and Daubanes (2016) model OPEC as a monolithic
limit pricing cartel. They investigate the optimal pricing strategy that is chosen by the
cartel in order to deter the entry of substitutes.
Berg et al. (1997).5 These authors achieve this by comparing long-
term net present values for a monolithic OPEC against what would
be obtained if the cartel were to dissolve and act competitively. They
ﬁnd that OPEC enjoys moderate to substantial gains from cartelizing.
More speciﬁcally, Pindyck (1978a) ﬁnds gains of 50% to 100%, Grif-
ﬁn and Xiong (1997) ﬁnds 24%, whereas Berg et al. (1997) ﬁnds gains
of 18%. While these aggregate estimates indicate that there are ade-
quate incentives for OPEC to cartelize, these unfortunately do not
tell us much about OPEC’s degree of collusiveness. Understanding
the distribution of collusion gains across OPEC members and over
the different collusion possibilities, is key to understanding the effec-
tiveness of the OPEC collusion arrangement and hence the extent to
which OPEC can mark up the global oil price.
Our analysis indicates that collectively, OPEC enjoys positive
gains from perfect cartelization (estimated to be 25%), and thus has
positive incentives to cartelize. Heterogeneity within the cartel is,
however, an important factor that impedes full cooperation since
for plausible demand elasticity estimates, most members’ proﬁts
are observed to be non-monotonic in the degree of cartelization.
For most producers, individual proﬁts initially increase because of
collusion, but then begin to decline as cooperation approaches per-
fect cartelization. This decline is strengthened by the presence of
a non-OPEC fringe that increases its production whenever the car-
tel further withholds. In fact, non-OPEC producers are generally the
biggest gainers from OPEC’s attempts at stronger collusion. Because
of the non-OPEC “free rider” problem and heterogeneity between
OPECmembers, the perfect cartelization approach seems inadequate
for capturing the intricacies of OPEC behavior. Instead, OPEC plausi-
bly sets production where it can ensure the highest gains for most
of its members, while at the same time crowding out non-OPEC pro-
duction. Such an equilibrium point does not have to correspond with
perfect cartelization.
We point out that the more elastic the demand curve, the more
likely OPEC producers are to perfectly cartelize. This result is not
speciﬁc to OPEC, but is a general result. While Lofaro (1999) and Sel-
ten (1973) show that the number of producers in the cartel, Salant
et al. (1983) the size of the cartel relative to the fringe, and Hyndman
(2008) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) the level of demand will
inﬂuence cooperation in a cartel, to the best of our knowledge,
no study shows how demand elasticity inﬂuences cooperation in a
cartel. It is generally perceived that cartels are more likely to form
in cases where demand is inelastic. While this may appear to be the
case because of the high proﬁts that low (absolute) elasticities induce
when producers collude, it is not necessarily the case that the car-
tel will be a perfectly colluding one. The intuition behind this result
is that since gains from collusion are more (less) substantial with
inelastic (elastic) demand, cartel members need to make minimal
(deep) cuts in production, thus colluding less (more) stringently in
order to raise prices and hence proﬁts.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section
describes the structure and features of the global oil market model
used, including how coeﬃcients of cooperation are derived and
how they can be used to interpret the stringency of quota alloca-
tions. Scenarios to assess how varying the degree of OPEC collusion
affects OPEC proﬁts are also set up. The section then continues and
details the data used to parametrize the model. Section 3 presents
initial results from analyzing OPEC’s cartelization gains and elabo-
rates upon the impacts of demand elasticity on cartel collusion. The
5 Other studies such as Salant (1976) and Ulph and Folie (1980) use analytic
approaches to investigate the beneﬁts to producers when a segment of the market
colludes. While Salant (1976) shows that the fringe beneﬁts more, Ulph and Folie
(1980) by contrast show that the cartel gains more if it has a signiﬁcant cost advantage
over the fringe. To draw their conclusions, these analytic studies rely on changes in the
in situ value of the resource (i.e., the Hotelling rent) resulting from cartel formation,
rather than on present value proﬁts as is typical for numerical optimization models.
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full model for OPEC cooperation with bargaining modeled explicitly
is described in Section 4 and the corresponding simulation results
presented. Section 5 discusses and concludes the article.
2. The model
The proposed model is set up in the tradition of the literature
on optimal exploitation of an exhaustible resource with well-deﬁned
property rights and by asymmetric producers. Notable examples
include Salant (1976) and Benchekroun et al. (2009) who investi-
gate natural resource depletion in a cartel versus fringe framework;
Lewis and Schmalensee (1980), Loury (1986), and Polasky (1992)
who consider resource depletion in an oligopoly market; and Yang
(2008, 2013) and Okullo and Reynès (2011) who focus on optimal
resource depletion in the case of asymmetric cartel members and a
competitive fringe of producers. Additionally, the model takes into
account (i) the reserve additions process (Pindyck, 1978b; Livernois
and Uhler, 1987; Okullo et al., 2015), (ii) capacity investments or
adjustment (Cairns, 1998; Brandt et al., 2010), and (iii) geologically
constrained crude oil extraction (Okullo et al., 2015; Cairns, 2014;
Cairns and Davis, 2001).
The model is speciﬁed such that OPEC producers negotiate over
production allocations. This is as opposed to restricting their choice
set to non-cooperative or fully cooperative strategies (Salant, 1976;
Yang, 2008; Huppmann and Holz, 2012). There are two stages in
the OPEC decision tree and one stage in the non-OPEC case. In
the ﬁrst stage, OPEC producers negotiate over production alloca-
tions taking into account both their own and non-OPEC second
stage responses. In the second stage, OPEC and non-OPEC produc-
ers then choose their activity levels (i.e. production, investments in
capacity, and reserve development) simultaneously. OPEC produc-
ers take the quota restrictions as given and enforceable whereas
non-OPEC producers take the price path as given. This section will
present and discuss the second-stage problemwhile the formulation
and discussion of the ﬁrst-stage negotiation process is deferred to
Section 4.
The level of geographical detail in the model is comparable to
that in the models of Brandt et al. (2010) and Huppmann and Holz
(2012). Both these models solve a static rather than inter-temporal
planning problem, however, and do not consider the reserve addi-
tions process. Moreover, Brandt et al. models OPEC behavior as
competitive whereas, Huppmann and Holz are concerned only with
extraction and do not consider (endogenous) investments in capac-
ity. While the reserve additions process of our model can be likened
to that of Pindyck (1978b), a major difference is that additions in our
model serve the sole purpose of increasing the extractive resource
base and cannot be used to lower extraction costs. The reason for
this is that the cost function in our model is linked to cumulative
extraction/depletion, as opposed to depending only on the size of
the extractable reserve stock. Nonetheless, as explained in Okullo
et al. (2015), reserve additions together with geological constraints,
of which both are represented in our model, can rationalize a
U-shaped price path and bell-shaped production proﬁle, similarly to
Pindyck’s model. The keymechanism that explains this phenomenon
is that reserve additions relax the geological constraint on extrac-
tion which can lead to a pattern of increasing (falling) production
(prices) followed by falling (rising) production (prices) when the new
reserves added fail to offset the depletion effect.
Next, we highlight the notable features of the current model,
and then provide a full mathematical representation and description,
including the equilibria under which solutions are calculated.
2.1. Highlighted model features:
1. The model accounts for the increasingly important role for
unconventional resources in meeting future oil demand. That
is, in addition to conventional crude oil, themodel accounts for
oil supply from tar sands and natural gas liquids. Future ver-
sions of themodel will introduce shale oil that has experienced
a recent surge in the US.
2. Production is constrained by capacity, which is accumulated
through investments. Capacity grows slowly because of (i) the
positive marginal cost for installed capacity that avoids its
wasteful installation, and (ii) because of exogenously given,
history based physical limits on its periodical expansion. The
exogenous constraints reﬂect limits on the ability of produc-
ers in a given region to access capital and construct production
capacity.
3. Depletion rates, that account for natural decline in reser-
voir productivity, are represented in the model (Adelman,
1990; Nystad, 1987; Cairns and Davis, 2001; Okullo et al.,
2015). These impose reasonable upper bounds, as dictated by
geological constraints, on the share of reserves that can be
extracted in every period. Empirical data indicate that most
extraction regions quickly approach a maximal depletion rate,
after which extraction progresses at a constant fraction of the
reserve base. Data suggest this ﬁgure lies between 0.1 and 0.2,
which corresponds to reserve to production ratios between
ﬁve and ten years.
4. Reserve development is endogenous to the model. It is
assumed that producers know with full certainty the size
of their initial reserves and resource endowments. Producers
must, however, convert resources into reserves through costly
development to facilitate extraction. As previously explained
and as laid out in Okullo et al. (2015), reserve development
together with geological constraints can rationalize U-shaped
prices and bell-shaped production proﬁles.
5. The model has a suﬃciently detailed representation of the
global oil market. Eighteen oil producers are represented.
Each OPEC producer is accounted for individually except for
Venezuela and Ecuador that are modeled as one. In the case
of non-OPEC, seven producing regions are modeled: Asia and
the Paciﬁc, Brazil, Europe, Former Soviet Union, North America,
South and Central America, and Rest of the world. The group-
ing “Rest of the World” consists of producers from Africa and
the Middle East that are not in OPEC. On the demand side, the
model accounts for two regions, OECD and non-OECD, to better
capture the dynamics for oil eﬃciency.
2.2. Model description
We now discuss the second stage of the model. The oil producers’
objective is to choose allocations for production, investments in
capacity, and additions to reserves in order to maximize the dis-
counted sum of net proﬁts. These choices are made subject to
dynamic changes in developed reserves, installed capacity, and
the depletion of undeveloped resources. In each period, a set of
(instantaneous) constraints ensure that production neither exceeds
installed capacity, nor the geologically extractable reserve base, and
that capacity can only be expanded gradually in line with histori-
cal and ﬁnancial limits. For each OPEC producer, the pre-negotiated
level of output, i.e., the quota, restricts output choice. We assume
that quotas are enforceable. That is, the negotiated production allo-
cation is never exceeded although, a producer may choose to under
produce it.6
6 While this assumption may appear restrictive, data for OPEC countries presented
in Table 1 of Dibooglu and AlGudhea (2007) shows that deviations from allocated
quotas happen only occasionally and are acceptably small when considered over the
duration of more than a year.
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The mathematical representation for producer i′s second stage
problem over a foreseeable future, t ∈ [t,∞), is:
max
qit ,Iit ,xit
pit =
∫ t=∞
t=t
(P (Yt ,Qt) qit − C (qit ,Rit , Sit) − W (Iit) − Z (xit)) e−dtdt
(1)
s.t.
R˙it = xit − qit (2)
K˙it = Iit − DKit (3)
S˙it = −xit (4)
Kit ≥ qit , cRit ≥ qit , bKit ≥ Iit − DKit (5)
q˜it = qit + sit i ∈ c (6)
Rit , Sit , Kit > 0, Rit , Sit , Iit , Kit , qit , xit , sit ≥ 0; i = 1, . . . . . . ,n; t ∈ [t,∞)
(7)
where the initial reserve size, Rit , initial capital stock, Kit , and initial
resource stock, Sit , are known, given, and positive. Non-negativity
constraints govern the levels for reserves, Rit, capacity, Kit, resources,
Sit, production, qit, investments, Iit, and additions to reserves, xit. c
denotes the OPEC cartel, q˜it the quota allocation to a member of the
OPEC cartel, and sit a slack variable which is equal to zero when
the quota constraint is binding and positive when it is slack.7 Drop-
ping indices where no confusion arises, P(•) is the oil price which is
a function of aggregate production, Q, and autonomous demand, Y.
C(•) is the cost of extracting oil, W(•) the cost of investing in new
capacity, and Z(•) the cost of converting undeveloped resources into
extractable reserves. The discount rate, depreciation rate for capital,
and the intensity of geological constraints8 are denoted by d, D, and
c respectively, while b gives in percentage, the periodical limit to
capacity expansion.
Eq. (2) says that reserves decline through extraction, but
are augmented through additions.9 Capacity, in contrast, expands
through investment, but declines because of depreciation10 (Eq. (3)).
The dynamics for the resource base are given by Eq. (4) which says
that resources decrease by the amount that is developed, that is, the
amount that is added to proven reserves. The instantaneous con-
straints represented in Eq. (5) require that production per period
neither exceeds installed capacity nor the geologically extractable
reserve base, cRit, and that capacity expansion is bounded by the
periodical physical limit, bKit. Eq. (6) applies only to OPEC producers.
It says that production is at most as great as the assigned quota.
Salant’s dominant cartel versus competitive fringe model is simi-
lar to our second stage model. OPEC producers know the form of the
7 Since we assume that quotas are enforceable, we do not deal with possibility that
sit < 0.
8 For an extended discussion on how c inﬂuences production, please see Okullo
(2016).
9 As demonstrated in Okullo et al. (2015), modeling both the extraction and the
reserve augmentation process, combined with the constraint cRit ≥ qit in Eq. (5)
allows us to account for the impacts that geological constraints can have on produc-
tion and price proﬁles. In particular, over the interval where qit = cRit , production
traces a geologically constrained extraction path, such that empirically observed bell-
shaped production paths and U-shaped paths for price and rent are explainable by the
model.
10 Note that investments in capacity expansion cease before extraction ceases
because as extraction draws to a close, the marginal cost of installing new capacity
exceeds the discounted marginal value of this capacity.
demand function; they each perceive price to be a function of their
individual output and therefore act as price setters. Given the quota
constraint, an OPEC producer chooses its actions, taking as given
other OPEC members’ choices and those of the non-OPEC fringe. The
seven non-OPEC producers by contrast, know only the time path
for price. They form the competitive fringe, choosing their actions
(i.e., production, investment, and reserve development), conditional
on the given crude oil price path.
We assume that only the initial states (i.e., reserves, capacity,
and resources) and time are relevant for the formation of a pro-
ducer’s strategy. This means producers’ strategies are open-loop.
Such strategies are well-known to be computationally tractable and
impose reasonable informational constraints on the producer since
knowledge of states at every possible instant is not required.11 How-
ever, as we discuss later in Section 4, the two stage structure of
our model combined with the open loop information structure may
result in time inconsistent solutions.12 We address this issue in
greater detail in that section.
Formulating the Lagrangian for the producer’s problem and tak-
ing derivatives (see Appendix A), we obtain the condition that the
OPEC producer chooses production such that marginal revenues13
are equal to the full marginal cost of production:
Pt(•)
(
1+
qit
eot q
c
t
)
= Cqit (•) + kit + lit + jit +yit (8)
where kit, l it, j it, and yit are shadow prices associated with the
reserve stock, extractable reserves base, installed capacity, and quota
constraint, respectively. eot =
(ew−en)
qct
Qt + en. eot (< 0), is the residual
demand elasticity that OPEC producers face, where ew(< 0) denotes
the global price elasticity of demand for oil14 , and en(> 0) is the price
elasticity of supply for non-OPEC oil. qct is total production by the
cartel, and Cqit (•) is themarginal cost of extraction.When the shadow
price on the quota constraint is positive, yit > 0, then sit = 0 and
producers extract at their assigned quotas. On the other hand, when
the quota constraint is inactive, i.e., sit > 0, then yit = 0 meaning
that the quota does not impose any economic cost to the producer.
Eq. (8) can be rewritten to provide an evaluation of the degree
of cartelization. Taking yit into the brackets on the left hand side of
Eq. (8) gives, after some algebra:
Pt(•)
(
1+ vit
1
eot
+ (1 − vit) qiteot qct
)
= Cqit (•) + kit + lit + jit (9)
where vit = −yite
o
t q
c
t
Ptq
c−i
t
, for qc−it the production of the cartel excluding
member i′s production. In the literature (see e.g., Cyert and DeGroot,
1973; Geroski et al., 1987; Lofaro, 1999; Symeonidis, 2000), vit is
referred to as the coeﬃcient of cooperation and sometimes as the
market conduct parameter. It provides a concise evaluation of the
degree of cartelization. Values close to zero indicate low degrees of
11 See Dockner et al. (2000) for a discussion of open-loop and Markov or feedback
strategies.
12 Time inconsistency means that a plan found to be optimal as of a certain initial
planning date, ceases to be optimal when the decision is reconsidered after sometime
has elapsed. In our model, this means at time t1 OPEC producers ﬁnd a certain time
path of quota allocations to be optimal. After some time has elapsed say at a time
t2(> t1), the plan is reconsidered. Inconsistency arises when they ﬁnd that continuing
with the original plan would be non-optimal and therefore they announce a new time
path of quota allocations.
13 Non-OPEC producers equate price rather than marginal revenues, to their full
marginal cost. That is, Pt(•) = Cqit (•) + kit + lit + jit . Note that non-OPEC producers
are not bound to quota restrictions.
14 Since two demand regions are modeled, ew is computed by weighting the demand
elasticity of the two regions, OECD and non OECD, by their optimal consumption
levels.
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collusion, i.e., less stringent quota allocations, whereas values close
to one indicate highly collusive behavior. vit = 0 corresponds to
independent non-cooperative behavior while vit = 1 corresponds
to the fully cooperative outcome, i.e., joint proﬁt maximization. In
the former, producers act as Cournot–Nash oligopolies whereas, in
the latter, the different cartel producers act as though they belong
to a multi-national monopoly. Note that the complementary slack-
ness condition for quota allocation requires yit (q˜it − qit) = 0 which
implies that vit (q˜it − qit) = 0. Since yit is the proﬁt that can be had
by the producer if the quota constraint is marginally relaxed at an
instant, it follows from the strict concavity of the objective function
and by the envelope theorem (cf., Léonard and Long, 1992, p. 36) that
there is a negative relationship between the allocated quota and the
coeﬃcient of cooperation.15 Thus, the more stringent the allocated
quota, the higher the level of cooperation.
Given an allocation of quotas, we can solve the second-stage
problem and calculate (implied) levels of cooperation. Equivalently,
given levels of cooperation, we can solve the second stage model to
recover quota assignments. In the rest of the analysis, we shall focus
on vit to evaluate the degree of cartelization in OPEC. In Section 3,
we exogenously vary the coeﬃcient of cooperation and examine how
OPEC members’ proﬁts change. In Section 4, we shall determine the
optimalvit using the Nash Bargaining Solution concept. Optimal here
refers to choosing values for vit such that the equilibrium satisﬁes
the Nash bargaining solution. To keep the (numerical) analysis of
Section 3 and part of Section 4 tractable, we shall ﬁx vit to be the
same for all OPEC producers butwill, in Section 4, discuss and present
simulation results for the case where vit is allowed to differ among
producers. Restricting vit = vjt i, j ∈ c amounts to imposing the con-
dition that revenues foregone due to the imposed quota restrictions,
are the same for all colluding producers.16 This can help narrow the
strategy space, which in turn allows for faster numerical evaluation
of the solution to the negotiation stage problem.
2.3. Additional model attributes
To complete the model, the following are deﬁned:
1. Let k denote the two modeled demand regions OECD and
non-OECD. The demand function used in the model is of an
isoelastic form: Qkt = AkPet Y
(gk+g1k logYkt)
kt , where Qkt is con-
sumption in region k at time t, Ak is the autonomous demand,
Ykt is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) used to delineate the
time dependent shift in the demand for oil. ek(ek < 0) is the
elasticity of demand for oil, gk(gk > 0) the income elasticity,
and g1k(g1k < 0) a coeﬃcient for energy eﬃciency. For details
on the suitability of this speciﬁcation, see Medlock and Soligo
(2001).
2. For each oil producer (eighteen in total), the following cost
functions are used: C (qit ,Vit) = c¯i×q2it×
(
ai +Vit(1 − Vit)
1
bi
)
for production costs,W(Iit) = w¯i × Iit for investment costs, and
Z(xit) = z¯i × x2it for ﬁnding and development costs. c¯i is the
coeﬃcient used to (iteratively) calibrate the simulation model,
so as to ensure that observed production in the base year, is
15 The envelope condition can be written down as: dptdq˜it =
∂Lt
∂ q˜it
= yit where pt and
Lt are evaluated at the optimum. Strict concavity of the objective function implies that
∂yit
∂ q˜it
, ∂vit
∂ q˜it
< 0.
16 To see this, note that vit = vjt , i = j implies that qc−jt yit = qc−it yjt . If quotas are
slack, yit = 0 and therefore there is no opportunity cost from collusion. In the case
of only two negotiating producers, it is straightforward to see qityit = qjtyjt which
by deﬁnition says that foregone revenues should be the same between the colluding
producers.
reproduced by the model. Vit tracks the state of depletion of
the producer’s resource base17, and ai(ai > 0) and bi(bi < 0)
are the coeﬃcients that set the producer’s initial costs of pro-
duction and the speed at which production costs rise with
depletion, respectively. w¯i is the producer’s marginal cost of
investment which is also equivalent to the average investment
cost, whereas z¯i is a coeﬃcient used to calibrate the producer’s
discovery costs. Notice that depletion effects are introduced
only in extraction costs and not in investment or reserve aug-
mentation costs. This has been done for simplicity and also
for lack of data to properly calibrate the investment or reserve
augmentation cost functions. Moreover, depletion effects at
capacity installation or reserve augmentation costs are of sec-
ond order and thus likely not as critical for oil pricing decisions.
Future extensions of the model could, nevertheless, consider
these extensions as the data become available.
2.4. Scenarios, data and algorithm
For the initial investigation into the effect of cooperation on
OPEC proﬁts, the following market structures are speciﬁed on the
premise that non-OPEC producers are always acting competitively:
(i) Competitive (COM): in this market OPEC producers supply com-
petitively without any market power. This structure is used as a
benchmark against which OPEC’s gains to cartelization are com-
puted. (ii) Oligopoly (OLI): here OPEC producers act independently,
i.e., vit = 0,∀ i ∈ c and t. As a consequence, there are no gains from
cooperation, and the strategies used are Cournot–Nash. (iii) Imper-
fect collusion 1 (ICOL1): OPEC producers in this instance partially
collude, but with a low level of cooperation (vit = 0.2,∀ i ∈ c and t).
This implies that while quotas are closer to Cournot–Nash quantities,
there may be moderate gains to members from agreeing to coordi-
nate production strategies. (iv) Imperfect collusion 2 (ICOL2): here
the coeﬃcient of cooperation is set at a much higher level than in
ICOL1, but is still smaller than that implied by joint proﬁt maximiza-
tion. We set vit = 0.8,∀ i ∈ c and t. In this scenario, while the cartel
may be effective at constraining output and raising prices, total prof-
its of the group are not at maximum yet. Moreover, it may turn out
that for some members, coordinating strategies at this level may be
more proﬁtable than at joint proﬁt maximization. (v) Perfect collu-
sion (COL): i.e., vit = 1,∀ i ∈ c and t. OPEC producers in this instance
extract oil subject to the same marginal revenue curve. This implies
that full marginal costs of extraction are equalized across members.
Eﬃciency in this case implies that the least cost producers attain
relatively larger quotas while production from higher cost periods is
deferred to later periods.
Data used in the simulations are as follows. Elasticities are taken
from the literature (Krichene, 2002; Gately and Huntington, 2002;
Dahl and Sterner, 1991): long-term OECD demand and income
elasticities are set to −0.7 and 0.56, respectively, whereas non-OECD
demand and income elasticities are set to−0.4 and 0.53, respectively.
Non-OPEC’s elasticity of oil supply is set to 0.1 (Horn, 2004). For
energy eﬃciency, we set g1 to−0.2 and−0.1 for OECD and non-OECD
respectively. These energy eﬃciency estimates have been chosen
to correspond with estimates from Medlock and Soligo (2001).
GDP projections are taken from IIASA (2009); they correspond to
their medium growth estimates. Base year production and proven
reserves estimates are taken from BP (2009) and OPEC (2011),
while remaining resources are computed from USGS (2000a) mean
17 Vit =
Rio+Sio−(Rit+Sit)
Rio+Sio−Sit increases monotonically in resource depletion. This is dif-
ferent than Pindyck’s speciﬁcation where costs are related to reserves instead of the
total resource stock or cumulative extraction, such that costs in his model can decline
when the reserve base grows.
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estimates of ultimately recoverable reserves. Data on production,
investment, and exploration costs are collected from Aguilera et al.
(2009), Brandt (2011), and EIA (2011).18 Following Pindyck (1978a),
Salant (1982), and Griﬃn and Xiong (1997) the same discount rate
of 5% is used for all producers; assuming equal discount rates is
standard in such analysis.
The model is solved as a Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP)
using the GAMS PATH complementarity programming solver19
(Ferris and Munson, 2000). For a range of plausible elasticity esti-
mates, the programmed algorithm is ﬁrst checked for validity,
robustness, and consistency by (i) assigning any two players the
same initial conditions and (ii) altering the order of players in the
model. In the ﬁrst case, two producers with the same initial con-
ditions are observed to attain the same extraction, investment, and
reserve additions proﬁles. Then, by changing the order of produc-
ers when solving for the optimized proﬁles, the algorithm always
converges to the same proﬁle for each producer irrespective of its
position in the order. To validate the uniqueness of the solution,
widely diverging initial values are assigned to the decision variables,
each time the algorithm iteratively converges to the same solution.
Although the algorithm is solved for the period 2005 (the base
year) to 2100, in order to minimize distortions to proﬁles as a
result of using a ﬁnite (rather than an inﬁnite) planning horizon, the
reporting period is limited to 2065. Additionally, to reduce compu-
tational time, each model period is set equal to ten years. Models
such as ours are designed to capture long-term trends and, there-
fore, simulated results cannot explain short-term and usually erratic
ﬂuctuations that are observed, for example in the oil price. More-
over, as is standard in such analysis, our results should be seen as
indicative scenarios given the best available data collected andmodel
speciﬁcation, but not actual real world predictions.
3. Results: gains to cartelization
Fig. 1 shows the global oil price and the global oil production
proﬁle when OPEC producers are Cournot–Nash oligopolies (OLI) in
the residual demandmarket. These projections for productionmatch
well with observed 2014 data20 and also closely track IEA (2014)
projections to 2025. Beyond 2025, our projections are more con-
servative than IEA (2014) projections, however. The reason for the
divergence is that we adopt a more conservative assumption for
available resources and we do not model production from newer
unconventional resources, such as shale oil that has experienced a
recent surge from near negligible levels back in 2005. Ourmodel pre-
dicts 86.07 mbd of global oil production in 2015, which compares
well with 2014 production of 86.03 mbd, having subtracted 4.2 mbd
of 2014 shale oil supply (EIA, 2015).
In the initial years, a steadfast increase in OPEC production is
observed; this increase is primarily driven by a strong demand for oil
and declining production in non-OPEC countries. More speciﬁcally,
Saudi Arabia is seen to initially follow an expansionary production
policy as it increases production from about 10.8 mbd in 2005 to
18 A detailed description on how the production cost function is calibrated for each
region is given in Okullo and Reynès (2011). Because of diﬃculty in acquiring invest-
ment costs data, the same average investment costs per barrel of capacity per year is
used for all producers in each oil resource category; this data on average investment
costs is from Brandt (2011) Table 3.10. The data for exploration costs are obtained
from EIA (2011) Table 11 where it is given as ﬁnding costs. This data is at regional lev-
els. For any producers that fall in the same region, the same exploration costs proﬁle
is assumed.
19 The optimality (ﬁrst order and transversality) conditions used to implement the
model’s algorithm are given in Appendix A.
20 We compare against 2014 observations because data for the 2015 calendar year is
not available yet at the time of writing. See the International Energy Statistics section
of the Energy Information Administration website for further details on historical
crude oil production data.
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Fig. 1. Global crude oil production proﬁle and global crude oil price, 2005 to 2065.
14.8 mbd in 2035. However, due to geophysical21 constraints and
a slower growth in global oil demand,22 its production declines
thereafter to 13.2 mbd in 2065. Other OPEC producers initially fol-
low an even more expansionary policy than Saudi Arabia. By 2035
(peak year for non-Saudi OPEC production), their production is
observed to increase by 10 mbd from 2005 levels, before falling
by 3.3 mbd to a production level of 30.7 mbd in 2065. Non-Saudi
OPEC production declines principally because of geophysical restric-
tions and resource limitations in smaller countries such as Algeria
and Libya. Production in non-OPEC countries but the Former Soviet
Union, Brazil, and the group Rest of the World, monotonically
declines from its 2005 levels also due to geophysical constraints and
resource limitations.
The simulated global oil price rises from 2005 US $55 in the year
2005 to $68 in 2015, and continues rising monotonically eventually
reaching $172 in the year 2065. This rising oil price is not in contra-
dictionwith a rising OPECmarket share due to (i) larger endowments
of oil in OPEC23 and (ii) imperfect as opposed to perfect competition
in OPEC. As such, OPEC reserves are extracted relatively slowly such
that its market share increases in the long-run even as the global oil
price rises. In the short tomedium term, rising global oil prices can be
negatively correlatedwith OPECmarket share, however. Geopolitical
and demand shocks can drive up oil prices for extended periods of
time, causing oil to be economically extracted in other high cost
regions. Eventually, the cartel may decide to pursue a market share
strategy in order to deter or stymie substitutes. Such mechanism are
discussed in Behar and Ritz (2016) and de Sá and Daubanes (2016).
How does the global oil production and price proﬁle change if
OPEC acts as a perfect cartel instead? The impact of switching behav-
ior from Cournot–Nash is substantial. We see from Fig. 2 that perfect
cartelization (full collusion) by OPEC leads to signiﬁcant reductions
in output by Saudi Arabia, but even more so for the other OPEC
countries. These reductions increase the oil price which in turn
induces non-OPEC countries to increase their production. Never-
theless, because non-OPEC countries have less resources, the cuts
by OPEC countries more than outweigh the non-OPEC increase in
production, ultimately leading to substantially higher prices for the
OPEC full collusion outcome as compared to the OPEC oligopoly out-
come. Indeed, the global oil price in the COL outcome is 9 dollars
higher than in OLI in 2005, and close to 93 dollars higher in 2065.
21 Geophysical refers to the interaction of geological and capacity constraints.
22 A declining global oil intensity leads to a slower growth in global oil demand.
23 As of 2014, OPEC owned up to 81% of the worlds economically proven oil reserves,
see http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm. Moreover, well over
50% of ultimately recoverable oil reserves are in OPEC countries USGS (2000b).
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Fig. 2. The difference in production, and price, between the full collusion (COL) and
oligopoly (OLI) scenarios.
3.1. Incentives for perfect collusion
The reductions that OPEC makes to its extraction bring positive
gains to the cartel. As Table 1 shows, full cartelization increases OPEC
gains by 25% relative to the competitive outcome. This gain of 25%
is in line with estimates by Griﬃn and Xiong (1997); Berg et al.
(1997). A possible explanation for this congruence, despite the higher
prices that are observed in the oil market since the early 2000’s is an
increase in extraction, development, and exploration costs that may
have limited the increase in OPEC gains. Indeed, Energy Informa-
tion Administration data indicates that over the period 1999 to 2007,
average crude oil lifting costs (and ﬁnding costs) increased steadily
to nearly double (respectively, triple) levels (EIA, 2011). More impor-
tantly, however, by comparing OPEC’s full cartelization gains of 25%
to the 9% that is obtained if the cartel is simply a Cournot oligopoly,
it is apparent that OPEC members have strong incentives to collude.
OPEC’s cooperation generates substantial beneﬁts for non-OPEC
producers as well. Table 1 shows that non-OPEC producers proﬁts
increase by 65% compared to the case were the cartel acts compet-
itively. This increase in non-OPEC oil wealth indicates the challenge
that OPEC faces in the real world. That is, although collusion allows
OPEC to increase its gains, the fact that they also increase non-OPEC
gains could entice some members to overproduce their quota allo-
cations so as to reap some of the beneﬁts that would otherwise go
to non-OPEC producers. This tendency, has in the literature been
referred to as cheating and is thoroughly investigated by Griﬃn
and Xiong (1997). In this paper, we argue that the increase in non-
OPEC proﬁts, due to OPEC collusion, has broader implications that
inﬂuence OPEC’s actual structure and the way quotas are allocated.
OPEC will structure itself as an imperfect cartel so as: (i) to more
evenly distribute among members the burden of holding back pro-
duction and (ii) to realize more of the gains from its own attempt
at collusion, that would otherwise go to non-OPEC producers. These
Table 1
OPEC and non-OPEC net present values (NPV) in 2005 trillion US$ and resource
extraction under alternative scenarios of OPEC cohesiona.
COM OLI COL
NPVs (Tn. $) Total 28.69 31.14 (9%) 41.37 (44%)
OPEC 14.86 16.15 (9%) 18.61 (25%)
Non-OPEC 13.83 14.98 (8%) 22.76 (65%)
Cum. extraction (bbls) Total 1838.67 1783.20 1510.72
OPEC share 58% 56% 40%
a In brackets is the percentage increase in OLI, COL relative to COM.
Table 2
OPEC members’ and non-OPEC net present values (NPV) in 2005 trillion US$ under
alternative scenarios of OPEC cohesiona.
Percentage gain relative to COM
COM ICOL1 ICOL2 COL
Algeria 0.50 23% 45% 44%
Angola 0.38 23% 47% 45%
Iran 1.86 19% 26% 22%
Iraq 0.88 20% 21% 14%
Kuwait 1.16 21% 27% 22%
Libya 0.67 23% 35% 30%
Nigeria 0.87 22% 35% 31%
Qatar 0.42 23% 31% 25%
Saudi Arabia 5.21 10% 20% 23%
United Arab Emirates 1.15 21% 27% 22%
Venezuela 1.76 21% 33% 30%
Total OPEC 14.86 17% 27% 25%
Non-OPEC 13.83 18% 53% 65%
a In the calculation of net present values, earnings follow output. There are no
transfers between colluding producers.
explanations are particularly credible since recent econometric evi-
dence (Smith, 2005; Kaufmann et al., 2008) indicates that OPEC
ﬁts neither Cournot oligopoly nor perfect cartelization models. We
investigate this issue next.
3.2. Incentives for partial collusion
Table 2 shows OPEC’s net present values, by producer, in the
competitive (COM) outcome – the case in which the OPEC cartel
is dissolved and its members take the oil price as given – and the
percentage increase in gains when collusion is at v = 0.2 (ICOL1),
v = 0.8 (ICOL2), and v = 1 (COL). Notably, by moving from COM to
ICOL1, all OPEC producers gain, and in turn the cartel. Moving even
further to ICOL2, all members still gain and so does the cartel. But
on moving further to COL, all OPEC members, with the exception of
Saudi Arabia (indicated in bold), loose relative to the ICOL2 outcome,
meanwhile non-OPEC gains continue to rise. Because of the general
losses within OPEC ranks, the cartel as a whole looses.
What these observations indicate is that heterogeneity24 within
the OPEC cartel greatly inﬂuences the beneﬁts OPEC members indi-
vidually earn from cooperation, which then inﬂuences OPEC’s likely
choice for v and hence the way quotas are allocated to members.
Clearly, members collectively gain over a part of the cooperation
values. As the sacriﬁces from cooperation become greater to some
members, however, these members start to loose. Considering that
OPEC quotas are determined through negotiation, it is more logical
that OPEC producers would settle for ICOL2, instead of COL; ﬁrst,
since more members gain, and second, because for the parameter-
ized supply and demand elasticities, the cartel as a whole gains by
staying at ICOL2. This suggests that OPEC will not necessarily assign
quotas so as to equalize marginal revenues (as a perfect cartel would
do), but will inherently recognize differences in marginal revenue
curves between members when assigning quotas. This is in fact a
plausible reason why econometric testing for OPEC behavior as a
perfect cartel has been in vain.
In support of the notion that members could ﬁnd it hard to com-
mit to a full cooperation outcome, we also see from Table 2 that
the existence of the non-OPEC fringe, and of course their level of
oil supply, further limits the gains that OPEC producers attain from
increased cooperation. To allow for higher proﬁts, cartel members
24 Note that heterogeneity between producers in our model is captured through
reserve and resource endowments, production level, initial level ofmarginal costs, and
steepness of marginal costs as reserves and resources get increasingly depleted.
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have to cut their production far below the level that the fringe can
offset; this is the only way OPEC can set high prices on the oil mar-
ket. The more OPEC cuts production, however, the more proﬁtable it
becomes for the fringe to increase production. Indeed, by OPEC mov-
ing from ICOL1 to ICOL2, then to COL, non-OPEC becomes the bigger
beneﬁciary. Why would OPEC attempt stronger collusion when in
effect most of the gains are being eaten away by non-OPEC coun-
tries? Instead, OPEC will most likely choose a level of cooperation
lower than that implied by COL, so as to crowd out more of non-
OPEC’s price-dependent production and retain relatively more proﬁt
for its members. Simply put, OPEC will assign quotas not as a perfect
cartel, but instead as an imperfect cartel. Next, we show that OPEC’s
optimal cooperation level (choice for v) is substantially inﬂuenced
by demand elasticity in the oil market.
3.3. Changes in demand elasticity
The impact of changes in demand elasticity are not investigated
in the studies of Griﬃn and Xiong (1997) and Berg et al. (1997).
Yet, as Dahl and Sterner’s survey on elasticities indicates, the uncer-
tainty about demand elasticities is rather large. Therefore, to see
how OPEC’s gains might be inﬂuenced if elasticities are incorrectly
speciﬁed, we double25 demand elasticities for OECD and non-OECD
to −1.4 and −0.8, respectively. This is equivalent to providing con-
sumers with more substitutes to which they can turn to given a
unit increase in the oil price. Moreover, it implies that the price
path obtained using these larger elasticities should be lower than
that implied by the reference elasticities. The impact of these new
elasticities on net present values is reported in Table 3.
We see that with larger (absolute) demand elasticities, more
OPEC producers beneﬁt from full collusion than with lower
(absolute) demand elasticities. As indicated by the producers in bold,
the number of OPEC members who would favor (or become indif-
ferent about) full collusion now increases from one to six. The cartel
as a whole marginally gains by moving from ICOL2 (11.32%) to COL
(11.36%).With amore elastic demand curve, themodel indicates that
OPEC producers are more likely to adopt a more cooperative out-
come. Nonetheless, since half of the cartel still looses bymoving from
ICOL2 to COL, it follows that even under these circumstances, full
cooperation will not be the naturally prevailing strategy.
Increasing the elasticity of supply of non-OPEC oil from 0.1 to 0.4
also makes the elasticity of demand for OPEC oil more elastic. For
base year production levels, this is equivalent to increasing elasticity
of demand for OPEC oil from −1.51 to −1.92. We simulate the impli-
cations of this adjustment by rerunning themodel with the reference
OECD and non-OECD demand elasticities, but increase the supply
elasticity for non-OPEC oil as indicated. We ﬁnd that the cartel as
a whole increases gains by moving from ICOL2 (26%) to COL (27%).
Individually, the same members that do not loose from full collu-
sion in Table 3, are also found not to loose in this instance. Moreover,
Iran is now included in this group, bringing the number of members
who could favor full collusion to seven. Given that four out of the
eleven OPEC members still loose from full collusion, we still reach
25 Other than doubling, we can halve these long-run elasticities. Because of the
isoleastic demand function in Eq. (9), combined with OPEC’s market share of 40% of
world oil production, we are constrained to use combinations of OECD and non-OECD
elasticities that yield a consumption weighted elasticity of absolute value larger than
0.42. Otherwise, a negative marginal revenue would not be consistent with a positive
(full) marginal cost and thus we would be unable to obtain a solution to the OPEC per-
fect cartelization problem. The behavioral effects of knowing what happens when the
absolute elasticity is lower than one can be explored using a limit pricing model as in
de Sá and Daubanes (2016). This exercise is beyond the scope of this paper, however.
And although a linear demand function can allow us to use lower elasticities, the price
elasticity of demand in this instance can change with price in a manner that may not
be reﬂective of future market conditions, thus limiting its use for long-term analysis.
Table 3
OPEC members’ and non-OPEC net present values (NPV) in 2005 trillion US$ under
alternative scenarios about OPEC cohesion, doubled demand elasticities casea.
Percentage gain relative to COM
COM ICOL1 ICOL2 COL
Algeria 0.42 9% 19% 20%
Angola 0.32 9% 19% 20%
Iran 1.41 7% 11% 10%
Iraq 0.67 7% 9% 7%
Kuwait 0.89 7% 11% 10%
Libya 0.54 8% 14% 14%
Nigeria 0.70 8% 14% 14%
Qatar 0.33 8% 13% 12%
Saudi Arabia 3.80 5% 9% 10%
United Arab Emirates 0.88 7% 11% 10%
Venezuela 1.38 8% 13% 13%
Total OPEC 11.34 6% 11% 11%
Non-OPEC 11.77 6% 15% 19%
a In the calculation of net present values, earnings follow output. There are no
transfers between colluding producers.
the same conclusion: full cooperation will not naturally follow as the
prevailing strategy.
The mechanism through which OPEC members become indiffer-
ent about full cooperation, for an increasingly elastic demand curve,
is as follows. The large (absolute) demand elasticities induce a more
elastic marginal revenue curve. In such circumstances, scaling back
production by a small amount does not signiﬁcantly raise prices and
hence proﬁts. To ably do so, deeper cuts in production are necessary,
implying higher degrees of collusion by the cartel. Of the past studies
on OPEC cartelization – Berg et al. (1997), Griﬃn and Xiong (1997),
Pindyck (1978a) – no study highlights the possibility for the elasticity
of demand to inﬂuence OPEC cooperation as seen above. One reason
for this is that given collusion, OPEC is modeled as a perfect cartel,
which then reveals only one side of the story: gains from coopera-
tion are high (low) when demand is inelastic (elastic). It says nothing
about the degree of collusion required to suﬃciently raise prices.
Our analysis indicates that cartels will assign less (more) stringent
quotas when market demand is inelastic (elastic). This result is gen-
eralized analytically in Appendix B for the case of a non-exhaustible,
i.e., abundant, resource. In the literature on industrial organization,
it has been shown that the size of the cartel versus that of the fringe
(Salant et al., 1983), the number of members in the cartel (Lofaro,
1999, and the references therein), and the level of prices (Rotemberg
and Saloner, 1986), will inﬂuence the ability to collude. No study that
we are aware of shows how demand elasticity inﬂuences collusion.
Our result draws similarities to Rotemberg and Saloner’s where it
is shown that a cartel will behave less (resp. more) collusively in
periods of high (resp. low) demand.
4. Endogenous cartelization
The preceding section relies upon exogenous changes in the coef-
ﬁcient of cooperation to draw the conclusion that there is a strong
incentive for OPEC to structure itself as an imperfect cartel because
of: (i) heterogeneities within the cartel, (ii) the presence of the
non-OPEC fringe, and (iii) an inelastic demand curve that makes
it unlikely for OPEC to negotiate stringent production allocations.
This section expands on those results using an endogenously cho-
sen degree of cartelization. We continue to use the coeﬃcient of
cooperation as the negotiation variable instead of an explicit quota
allocation. We ﬁrst describe the methodology used to choose vit,
then present some numerical results.
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4.1. Methodology
We use the Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950, 1953) to select
the optimal vit, although, other bargaining models such as the Kalai–
Smorodinksy (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975) solution may be used.
To save on notation, we describe themodel set-up for the case where
vit is restricted to be identical across OPEC producers, i.e., vit =
vjt,∀ i = j; i, j ∈ c, but shall later present simulation results for the
casewherevit differ. Mathematically, the Nash bargaining problem
26
for the OPEC cartel is:
max
vt
Gt(•) =
∏
i∈c
pi
({
vt
}t=∞
t=t
)
(10)
s.t.
pi (vt) ∈ Y, vt ∈ [0, 1] (11)
where pi
({
vt
}t=∞
t=t
)
is the net present value proﬁt that accrues to
the OPEC member i at a time t for
{
vt
}t=∞
t=t levels of cooperation.
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Y denotes a compact set of possible proﬁt realizations. As earlier
mentioned, the model is set up as a two-stage problem. Objective
Eq. (10) is solved in the ﬁrst stage to maximize the product of
individual OPEC members’ net present value proﬁts by selecting
vt ∈ [0, 1] subject to the optimality conditions of the second stage
problem presented in Eqs. (1)–(7). Considering that vt is bounded
and since individual proﬁts are concave in vt, it is possible to ﬁnd
an optimal solution. Note that by virtue of vt being bounded at zero
from below, negotiating producers always earn at least their dis-
agreement (i.e., Cournot–Nash) proﬁts. Thus, the disagreement point
is implicitly embedded into the objective function (10) and does not
need to be introduced explicitly, as is usually the case, when setting
up the Nash Bargaining Problem.
Because the model (10)–(11) is hierarchical, solutions obtained
using open-loop strategies can be time inconsistent. This is the
property that when agents reconsider their solutions after some time
has passed, theymay have the incentive to deviate from their original
plans. Such solutions cannot be credible unless binding agreements
are assumed (Zaccour, 2008; Yeung and Petrosyan, 2012; Haurie,
1976). Our global oil model (10)–(11), is time inconsistent for two
reasons. Firstly, when the OPEC cartel reconsiders its quota decisions
after a period of commitment, it has the incentive to revise them
downwards, that is, issue more stringent quotas. The reason for this
being that at the time it reconsiders its decision, it perceives itsmem-
bers’ costs of collusion from that point onward as being lower than
before. The second effect works in the opposite direction. In this case,
the cartel would like to announce ambitious output targets so as to
pre-empt supply by the non-OPEC fringe, even when such a strategy
would not be credible ex-post (Groot et al., 2000, 2003).
We adopt two approaches for dealing with the time inconsistency
issue. The ﬁrst, is that in a model such as ours, the act of forming
the cartel can itself be regarded as a commitment device that binds
producers to their initially agreed plans. This negates the need to
reconsider plans after some time has elapsed. We shall, therefore,
present our open-loop results but they should strictly be regarded as
binding commitment solutions.
26 Although not introduced in the current model, it is possible to add bargaining
weights that are consistent with exogenous factors such as a member country’s GDP,
population, external debt and share of oil revenues in GDP. Alsalem et al. (1997)
reports that a combination of these variables are sometimes used by OPEC when
deciding how to distribute quotas.
27 Recall thatvt simply summarizes the extent towhich producers scale back output,
given that the optimal quota and optimal (individual) production coincide.
The often used approach for dealing with time inconsistency in
non-cooperative games is to compute feedback equilibria as these
strategies are known to be robust to off-equilibrium outcomes. How-
ever, considering the hierarchical play, the non-linear functional
forms, the multiple players, and multiple state variables28 in our
model, it is a non-trivial undertaking to try and ﬁnd sub-game perfect
solutions, unless of course the strategies employed by the producers
are severely restricted. Dockner et al. (2000) illustrates one of these
restrictions and shows that while the restriction does indeed gen-
erate a sub-game perfect equilibrium, there is no way of knowing
whether the imposed policy functions are indeed optimal. Moreover,
although such an approach may generate time consistent solutions,
it severely restricts strategic interaction in the model.
The second, and our chosen approach of dealing with time
inconsistency is to compute a renegotiated closed-loop sequential
equilibrium (Yang, 2003). In such an equilibrium, the original plan
is reconsidered after short-periods of commitment, where if new
plans deviate from the original plan, earlier plans are discarded
and the new plans taken up. The solution obtained here is akin
to what is observed in practice where contracts are drawn up but
are renegotiated after some time of commitment. The algorithm
for such an equilibrium requires solving the open-loop model
(10)–(11) sequentially through time, while each time picking the
solutions (i.e., quotas, production, and investments) of the initial
periods from each sequence and concatenating these to create the
equilibrium solution. Jørgensen et al. (2010) advocates for this strat-
egy in cases when the model under consideration is intractable for
computing feedback strategies and negotiation permits for periodical
reevaluation of strategies.
For our calculations, we use the GAMS NLPEC solver, with
CONOPT 3 as the subsolver (Ferris et al., 2005). The stability of our
solutions are veriﬁed by solving the model several times, each time
using diverging starting values for vt. For each solve, the algorithm
is found to converge to the same unique time path for v (including
other decision variables). In the next section we present some results
from the simulation model. Note that the intention here is to quan-
titatively examine how quotas are likely to be allocated to members
given their divergent attributes. This is especially important since
the joint proﬁt maximizing approach is unappealing because of its
assumption that members implement some form of revenue shar-
ing scheme. Our premise is that during negotiation, OPEC members
make concessions on the size of the quota that any particular mem-
ber receives, so as to give the various participants the incentive to
remain a part of the organization.
4.2. Results
We compare four equilibrium strategies for OPEC: (i) Cournot–
Nash oligopoly (v = 0), (ii) binding commitments Nash bargaining
with optimally chosen and identical vt, (iii) sequential commitments
Nash bargaining with optimally chosen and identicalvt, and (iii) per-
fect cartelization (v = 1). We label these, OLI, IC-BC, IC-SC, and PC,
respectively. The results presented next are based on the calibra-
tion of each speciﬁcation such that observed base year production is
reproduced. As indicated in Section 2.3, this is accomplished by iter-
atively recalibrating the coeﬃcient c¯ in the producers cost function.
As a result of this recalibration, net present value proﬁts are not a
good indicator of the incentive to cooperate, but v from the bar-
gaining solution is. The ensuing analysis is therefore not concerned
with how cooperation affects OPEC producers’ proﬁt, but rather the
28 The second-stage decision problem has eighteen producers each with three state
variables. This implies that the ﬁrst-stage OPEC negotiation is based on double the
number of second-stage states, since co-states to each second stage state become state
variables in the ﬁrst stage. This makes for one hundred and eight (18 × 3 × 2) state
variables over each we must approximate the subgame perfect equilibrium.
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Fig. 3. Global crude oil prices, 2005 to 2065, in three states of OPEC cartelization:
oligopoly (OLI), imperfect cartelization (IC-BC, IC-SC), and perfect cartelization (PC).
extent to which the simulated equilibrium for global oil production
with optimal cooperation coeﬃcients differs from the traditional
Cournot–Nash and perfect cartelization equilibria.
Fig. 3 shows the global crude oil price in the four scenarios of
OPEC cartelization. As expected, price in the perfect collusion (PC)
scenario is higher than price in the oligopoly (OL) scenario. Prices
implied by the bargaining outcomes are between the two extremes.
The bargaining solutions give rise to OPEC’s most plausible structural
arrangement, and thus provides insight into how OPEC might actu-
ally behave on the global oil market. We see that in this case, OPEC
allocates production quotas such that the global oil price is not so
high as to stimulate non-OPEC production, but not so low as to forgo
proﬁts from coordinating strategies.
Price in the bargaining with sequential commitments scenario
is higher than price in the binding commitments scenario. The rea-
son is that every time the OPEC cartel reconsiders its decision, as
spelled out in the deﬁnition of the equilibrium, the incentive to issue
more stringent quotas outweighs the incentive to pre-empt the non-
OPEC fringe leading to a delayed path for extraction and hence higher
global oil prices.
The coeﬃcients of cooperation resulting from OPEC’s strategies,
IC-BC and IC-SC, are shown in Fig. 4. Production allocations are most
stringent in the initial years, but then become gradually less strin-
gent overtime. As can be seen by comparing IC-BC to IC-SC, part of
this change can be explained by the perceived change in the costs
of commitment. The time paths highlight two issues that are in con-
trast to what is captured in the traditional cartel model. Firstly, that
the relative stringency of OPEC’s quota allocations can (optimally)
vary from period to period as indicated by the changing coeﬃcient
of cooperation, and secondly, OPEC strategies while plausibly highly
collusive, are insuﬃcient to classify it as a perfect cartel.
To check the robustness of our results, we reran the model
with doubled demand elasticities. We obtain nearly the same
time path as in Fig. 4, but with generally higher levels of
cooperation: in the IC-BC (IC-SC) scenario the cooperation coeﬃcient
is at 1.00 (1.00) in 2005, falling to 0.51 (0.70) in 2065. This indicates
that under a wide range of elasticities, OPEC will still prefer imper-
fect to perfect collusion, and, as earlier indicated, that OPEC is likely
to attain higher levels of cooperationwhen its residual demand curve
is more elastic.
Imperfect collusion has clear beneﬁts: it accrues relatively more
of the gains from cooperation to OPEC than to non-OPEC. To see
this, we compare the change in OPEC and non-OPEC net present val-
ues proﬁts for IC-BC and IC-SC relative to the PC structure. When
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Fig. 4. Optimal OPEC cooperation levels, 2005 to 2065.
OPEC acts as a perfect cartel (PC scenario), until 2065, it earns
US$ 24.02 trillion. In case it acts as an imperfect cartel with
binding commitments (IC-BC), it earns US$ 24.83 trillion, whereas
as an imperfect cartel with sequential commitments it earns
US$ 24.78 trillion.29 The difference for IC-BC and IC-SC relative to
PC is 3.4% and 3.2%, respectively. By contrast, non-OPEC earns US$
20.20 trillion in the PC structure, US$ 17.54 trillion in the IC-BC
structure, and US$ 18.52 trillion in the IC-SC structure, a percentage
reduction of −13.12 and −8.3, respectively. Clearly, non-OPEC looses
while OPEC accrues relatively more gains to itself from the choice to
imperfectly cartelize.
Fig.5 shows by howmuchOPEC (non-OPEC) production decreases
(increases) when OPEC acts as an imperfect cartel with binding
commitments, and also when OPEC acts as a perfect cartel, both
relative to the OLI outcome.30 In the PC scenario, OPEC reduces its
production by nearly twice as much, as compared to the IC scenario.
Clearly the deep cuts required for perfect collusion are far from
optimal from a negotiation perspective, otherwise the negotiating
producers would set all their cooperation coeﬃcients at one. So,
rather than increase proﬁts through further cuts in production, OPEC
ﬁnds it more suitable to supply more relative to perfect cooperation
so as to ensure that everymember is Pareto indifferent about cooper-
ation. The increased level of supply, more than crowds out non-OPEC
production allowing OPEC to receive a larger relative share of gains
in the oil market from its own attempts at collusion.
So far we have restricted our attention to the case where vit
is identical among OPEC producers. What happens when vit are
allowed to differ across OPEC producers? Our results indicate that the
difference in the production proﬁles for most producers is marginal
(not shown for brevity), and the difference in the price proﬁlemoder-
ate (see: Tables C.4 and C.5 in Appendix C). Concerning the coeﬃcient
of cooperation, we see in Tables C.4 and C.5 that it is optimal for
smaller OPEC producers (e.g., Qatar, Angola, Algeria) to behave less
collusively as compared to the larger producers (e.g., Saudi Arabia,
Iran, Venezuela, Kuwait). This allows smaller producers to follow an
evenmore more expansionary production approach, increasing their
production while the larger producers hold back. This observation
is particularly interesting. It indicates that during the negotiation
process, the power to acquire larger than proportionate production
29 Proﬁts are lower in IC-SC than in IC-BC despite higher crude oil prices, because
OPEC oil production is lower in IC-SC.
30 The graph for sequential commitments is not presented as it tells more or less the
same story.
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Fig. 5. Difference in production for IC relative to OLI (IC less OLI), and PC relative to OLI (PC less OLI), 2015 to 2065.
shares is biased towards smaller OPEC producers. Empirical support
for such behavior within cartels is reported in Libecap (1989) and
Griﬃn and Xiong (1997).
5. Discussion
The question of whether OPEC is a cartel or not has been the
subject of several econometric studies. Unfortunately, no consistent
answer arises from these exercises. Moreover, of the few numerical
simulation studies that have been used to study OPEC, none investi-
gates the likely structure of OPEC at a level of detail that sheds light
on individual members incentives to cartelize. In fact, the only study
that comes close is that of Griﬃn and Xiong (1997). The authors’
focus, however, is on OPEC members’ incentive to cheat and not
OPEC’s cartelization structure itself. In this paper, we have tried to
answer the question of what OPEC’s preferred degree of collusion is,
using a tractable empirically calibrated global oil market model. In
reality, OPEC behavior is of course inﬂuenced by several political and
economic uncertainties that can be diﬃcult to incorporate in simu-
lation models such as ours. Nonetheless, this should not prevent us
from trying to understand OPEC behavior on the basis of the best
available data. Our results overwhelmingly lead us to conclude that
OPEC is a cartel that is characterized by imperfect collusion. In the
words of Adelman (2002), OPEC is a clumsy cartel or in the words of
Smith (2005) a bureaucratic syndicate.
As our results indicate, imperfect collusion arises because the car-
tel has to balance both internal and external interests. Balancing
internal interests means that the cartel has to assign quotas in a
manner that would not cause some members to exit the arrange-
ment. This as indicated requires giving larger production quotas than
would be implied by effective collusion, more especially to smaller
producers. To balance external interests, OPEC has to ensure that
its production is large enough so as to crowd out non-OPEC supply
that thrives under situations of high prices. As was seen, effective
collusion generates high prices. To achieve these prices, OPEC must
cut output far beyond levels the fringe can offset; this increases
the cartels gains. Nonetheless, because non-OPEC production also
thrives under situations of high prices, perfect collusion of OPEC ben-
eﬁts the non-OPEC fringe more than it does OPEC. The optimal and
most plausible strategy for OPEC, therefore, is one of keeping prices
fairly low so as to discourage production, investment in capacity,
and exploration in non-OPEC countries, but still high enough to pro-
vide positive beneﬁts to its members from collusion. This strategy is
captured in the imperfect cartelization arrangement.
Effects of changes in the discount rate, income elasticity, changes
in the growth rate of GDP, and energy eﬃciency on OPEC cooperation
were investigated. These do not affect our conclusion that OPEC is
an imperfect cartel. They nonetheless inﬂuence the time path of the
cooperation coeﬃcient. A higher (lower) discount rate leads to lower
(higher) cooperation levels, a higher (lower) level of income elastic-
ity leads to a higher (lower) levels of cooperation, a faster (slower)
GDP growth rate implies higher (lower) levels of cooperation, and
ﬁnally a higher (lower) level of energy eﬃciency results in lower
(higher) levels of cooperation. Results are also checked for robust-
ness by assuming that the coeﬃcients, w¯ and z¯, on marginal explo-
ration and marginal investments are both 50% lower (resp. higher)
than used in themain simulations. Our conclusions about OPEC being
an imperfect cartel are upheld. The effects on the cooperation level
are ambiguous, however.
Given the above results, an important and yet general contribu-
tion of our paper is the introduction of a tractable model that can
be used to study cartelization in cases where there is imperfect col-
lusion between parties. Implied in our coeﬃcient of cooperation is
the extent to which producers scale back output in order to mark
up prices. Although we do not explicitly model the likelihood for
different producers to cheat on their quotas, the inclusion of this
dimension would likely make our conclusions on quota allocations
even stronger. This, in addition to extending the model to Markov
perfect strategies will be the focus of future work.
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